In the shadowy corridors of Tehran’s power, the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh at the end of July – widely believed to have been carried out by Israel – shattered a fragile equilibrium.

The timing of this escalation in the longstanding conflict between Iran and Israel could not have been worse, with newly sworn-in President Masoud Pezeshkian still getting used to his role when this geopolitical fireball was hurled into his lap.

For Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the assassination of the Palestinian group’s leader was more than a provocation, it was an existential challenge.

The explosion that killed Haniyeh, which Iran believed was a missile launched from within its own borders, was a breach of sovereignty that angered Tehran and put Khamenei’s 2003 fatwa prohibiting the manufacture, use and storage of nuclear weapons under increased scrutiny.

Strategic implications

The high-level debate over whether Khamenei’s fatwa on nuclear weapons served Iran’s strategic priorities was already continuing prior to Haniyeh’s assassination, according to a senior Iranian official who spoke to Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity.

Khamenei has steered Iran through global shifts from the Cold War’s end to the rise of United States unipolarity and conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria – and through the fraught history of Iran’s nuclear deal with world powers.

Now, at 85, he needs to secure the future of the Islamic republic, a critical juncture that requires more than manoeuvres in the “grey zone” – the space between war and peace that Iran has traditionally used to exert pressure on its adversaries.

The implications could reshape the Middle East’s strategic landscape at a time when negotiators are scrambling to reach a ceasefire deal that would end Israel’s brutal war on Gaza and, three weeks after the assassination, Iran has yet to indicate what it will do.

Asked whether Iran is withholding its attack on the Israeli regime so ceasefire talks can proceed, Iran’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Amir Saeid Iravani, told Al Jazeera: “The timing … of Iran’s response will be meticulously orchestrated to ensure that it occurs at a moment of maximum surprise.”

The assassination prompted intense debate in Iran, sources told Al Jazeera, with some arguing restraint as the wisest course, fearing a retaliatory strike could plunge Iran into a protracted and costly confrontation with Israel, which could weaken Tehran and its regional allies.

The restraint camp – from across Iran’s political spectrum – also expressed hope that calm now can serve as leverage in future negotiations with the US, potentially opening a new chapter in US-Iran relations and becoming a more potent response to Netanyahu’s provocations.

A woman holds a poster as she attends the funeral procession of assassinated Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on August 1, 2024 [Majid Asgaripour/West Asia News Agency via Reuters]

Khamenei’s choice

Khamenei did not agree.

Speaking to officials on August 14, he said Iran must not be intimidated by the psychological warfare its enemies were using.

Invoking the Quran, he added that “non-tactical retreats, whether in military, political, media or economic fields, will incur divine wrath”. Although there is no indication yet as to what he will do, it is a choice that could reshape the Middle East’s strategic landscape.

The nuclear question adds to the complexity.

Thus far, Iran’s nuclear policy has centred around its right to possess peaceful nuclear technology, Khamenei’s fatwa on the issue, and to exist in a nuclear-weapons-free zone, an official who wished to remain anonymous told Al Jazeera.

“In the broad sense, Iran’s nuclear policy still does not fall under the category of nuclear ambiguity like Israel,” the official said, referring to Israel’s refusal to disclose what nuclear capabilities it has.

However, a remark by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the UN last September and an Israeli minister advocating that Gaza be levelled with nuclear weapons have been perceived as threats by Iran, the official said, prompting Iran to rethink its strategy.

The US’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear agreement is another reason for Iran to recalibrate its approach, they added, explaining that Iran entered nuclear talks hoping sanctions on the country would be lifted in exchange for restrictions on its nuclear programme.

“But, what happened [when the US left the nuclear agreement]?” they ask rhetorically.

“Iran had to face the US’s maximum pressure policy without [being able to do] anything.”

Will the nuclear doctrine change?

“Iran’s response must … punish the aggressor for its act of terrorism and infringements upon Iran’s national sovereignty [as well as] bolster Iran’s deterrence capabilities to induce profound regret within the Israeli regime, thereby serving as a deterrent,” UN ambassador Iravani said.

“Furthermore,” he added, “Iran’s response must be carefully calibrated to avoid any possible adverse impact that could potentially influence a prospective ceasefire [in Gaza].”

That is a potentially impossible balance to strike.

In this context, the anonymous official says, “The threats shown by the Zionist entity [Israel] and the shift from a policy of ambiguity about their nuclear programme to a clear policy of nuclear threats against Iran at the United Nations … suggest that they may later target the nuclear facilities themselves.”

They add: “Iran needs to maintain its sovereignty, and … it is discussing revising its doctrine. If Israel’s nuclear weapons are not removed, there will be competition to possess nuclear weapons in the region, and Iran will absolutely reassess its strategy.”

Iran’s ambassador to the UN Amir Saeid Iravani speaking at the UN Security Council on April 14, 2024 [Eduardo Munoz/Reuters]

Asked whether they thought that Iran, if it changes its nuclear doctrine, would move to producing nuclear weapons, especially since Western and Israeli estimates say it is no more than a month away from producing a nuclear warhead, the anonymous official answered in the negative.

“Any change in the nuclear doctrine does not necessarily mean moving towards nuclear weapons,” the official said, adding that it could mean altering the current nuclear strategy, and affirming that any change would be directed towards Israel because it is threatening Iran.

Such a change may worry Iran’s neighbours but, the official added: “We’re open to any way to reassure our neighbours about our nuclear capabilities.

“The question remains whether our neighbours are ready to reassure us about their arms purchases and the threats posed by the presence of American bases on their lands.”

Ultimately, the choices before Khamenei are like the bitter cups he must drink from – the supreme leader faces a test of endurance as he weighs his options before him, each fraught with significant risks and uncertain outcomes.

The stakes have never been higher, as the world watches Tehran grapple with its most critical decision in decades.



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